We construct a 'divide the dollar' bargaining game which formalizes Schelling's notion of a 'qualitative commitment'. This requires a substantial capitulation cost to be incurreddiscontinuously -if and only if a player accepts a share of an asset below his pre-announced 'claim'on it, no matter how little below. The 'commitment game'opens with an 'announcement round' in which the two players simultaneously announce their claims on the asset, and is followed by a Rubinstein alternating-o¤ers 'negotiation subgame'. We determine the unique subgame-perfect, stationary, pure-strategy equilibrium outcome of the commitment game and …nd it to be e¢ cient. The main feature of the model is that gains, relative to the game without commitment, do result to the …rst-mover provided the capitulation cost is above a certain threshold. The more the capitulation cost exceeds the threshold, the greater is the gain. The higher the impatience level of the players, the higher the stakes need to be.
Introduction and Main Theorem

Motivation and model speci…cation
In his celebrated 'Essay on Bargaining' Schelling points to one source of bargaining power as the 'power to bind oneself ' and discusses observed pre-bargaining union activities undertaken to create a commitment tactic: 'stirring up excitement and determination in the union'for the purposes of making clear what the negotiators would not accept. In a word: spin. He argues that 'To be convincing, commitments usually have to be qualitative rather than quantitative' such as staking or 'pledging a principle', whereupon the agent persuades his adversary 'that he would accept stalemate rather than capitulate and discredit the principle. ' This paper proposes a quantitative analysis of Schelling's 'qualitative commitment', here translated into the bargainer sustaining a substantial enough capitulation cost if and only if his claim on the asset under negotiation is not met. Our starting point follows the received literature, see for example Muthoo (1999) , and de…nes a version G c of the 'divide a dollar' game. Thus in common with other authors, we begin with a preliminary round ('round 1') in which two players (simultaneously) announce their commitment not to accept a share of the dollar below their own announced 'claim' on the dollar (respectively z 1 ; z 2 ): A subsequent penalty structure and a resolution mechanism are required when con ‡icting claims arise, i.e. when claim pairs are announced summing above the dollar ( z 1 + z 2 > 1): For example, Muthoo (1996) uses an implicit negotiation mechanism with outcome characterized by the Nash Bargaining Axioms to arrive at a resolution of the claims. Our contribution is to adopt a di¤erent approach: we allow the bargainers to resolve claims by the use of an explicit negotiation scheme as a¤orded by the 'alternating-o¤ers'in…nite game-structure of Rubinstein (1982) and (1987) . Having made their announcements, the players are allowed to bid freely (make proposals for a division of the dollar) in the ensuing negotiation subgame N (z 1 ; z 2 ) = N c (z 1 ; z 2 ) comprising 'round 0', 'round 1' etc.
1 Despite this freedom, the players are in ‡uenced by the e¤ect on their utilities of the announced claims resulting from the capitulation cost (whenever incurred). The capitulation cost is a known penalty, deducted from the pay-o¤ of a player if revoking his or her commitment. The penalty is paid to a third party and is a function of the concession (i.e. the amount by which an agent accepts strictly below the announced claim). We assume the penalty structure is antecedent to the game G c (created by pre-bargaining activity), is known to the two players and is beyond their control in the game G c .
To formalize the qualitative character of the commitment, we take the view that in accepting a share x below the announced claim, z; the bargainer has 'discredited his principle', as staked on z; and su¤ers the same capitulation cost no matter how small the concession z x. We propose interpreting capitulation cost as a …xed proportion c of the original asset under negotiation 2 . It is in this sense that the penalty may be called a …xed charge, by contrast to the alternative of a progressive charge. We assume the players'utility re ‡ects both the cost of making a concession 1 Thus in the negotiation subgame, the players, starting with Player 1, take turns in proposing the division of the asset into a proportion x to be awarded to the player currently bidding and a proportion 1 x to the opponent. The opponent may either agree the division, or refuse it, and in so doing close the current round of bidding, becoming in turn the bidder of the new round.
2 Choosing a …xed proportion, rather than a …xed (absolute) amount, may be taken to re ‡ect a tacit understanding by the two negotiating parties of the need to employ some kind of release mechanism. In Schelling's words this amounts either to a kind of 'casuistry'for release from a public expectation of the preordained punishment of a broken commitment, or alternatively to a kind of 'rationalized re-interpretation of the original commitment' (applicable to the terms, at the very least, of the consequent penalty). and the passage of time. As for the latter we assume both players apply the same time discount factor (with 0 < < 1): We thus adopt a pay-o¤ structure that has the players valuing an agreement which in 'round n'of N (z 1 ; z 2 ) gives a proportion x of the asset to Player 1 and 1 x to Player 2, with 0 x 1; by reference to their the utility which is de…ned as follows: u 1 (x; n; z 1 ) = n w(x; z 1 ); u 2 (x; n; z 2 ) = n w(1 x; z 2 ); (1.1) where 0 < < 1 denotes the time discount factor, the amount by which the two players perceive the value to have shrunk at the end of any one round, and 3 w(x; z) = x c 1 [0;z) (x); (1.2)
where 1 A (x) is the indicator function of the set A. The utility of stalemate (perpetual disagreement) is zero; in particular w(x; z) < 0; for x < c; so that a Player may well receive negative pay-o¤ if o¤ered too little, and will then 'rather accept stalemate'. The utilities in the game N (z 1 ; z 2 ) are time homogenous. It seems natural therefore to seek out a subgame-perfect equilibrium supported by stationary (time homogeneous) strategies whereby each player proposes constantly the same share to Player 1 and accepts a minimum own share always at one and the same level, both levels being freely selected. Now consider, for the subgame N (z 1 ; z 2 ), the feasible set of utility-outcome pairs of 'round n', which we denote F n . Reference to (1.1) and the fact that the pay-o¤ at stalemate is zero shows that F n = f(u 1 ; u 2 ) : u 1 ; u 2 0 and u 1 = n w(x; z 1 ); u 2 = n w(1 x; z 2 ) 0; for some x with 0 x 1g. This set, albeit not in general convex, is star-shaped to the origin. The subgame N (z 1 ; z 2 ) is thus in principle amenable to a variation of the standard geometric arguments for identifying a subgame-perfect equilibrium division arising from the play of a pair of stationary strategies. We take a brief look at the corresponding geometry in order to observe the need for compensatory actions. Figure 1 shows F 1 = f(z 1 ; z 2 )g [ f(t; 1 c t) : t > z 1 or t < z 1 cg, where 4 z 1 + z 2 = 1: The set comprises three components: one point and two half-open intervals. For the (appropriately) chosen value of z 1 of this example the point A = (z 1 ; z 2 ) is a subgame-perfect outcome of N (z 1 ; z 2 ) supported by stationary (i.e. time independent) strategies.
The geometric justi…cation is the following. The point A is proposed by Player 1. It will be optimal for Player 2 to accept. To verify this she …rst identi…es the point B in F 2 on the horizontal through A; she is indi¤erent between A and B. But she cannot propose B in 'round 2'without some concession (or side-payment) to Player 1. Why? In the …rst place the point C vertically below B on F 3 is not even feasible for our selected value of z 1 , as C is at the open-end of one of the components of F 3 : She must therefore slide down to the point D on F 2 that is vertically above the point of F 3 nearest to C; which is the point Player 1 will propose (under the terms of the stationary strategy) if 'round 3'is reached. That point on F 3 is just the 'twice-delayed' version of A; namely E = 2 A on the radial line OA: Player 1 will propose E in 'round 3'and this proposal will be accepted. Thus (i) D is the contract point of F 2 of least or equal u 1 -coordinate to that of E; (ii) A is the contract point on F 1 of least or equal u 2 -coordinate to D: Player 2 is in fact better o¤ at D than at E; and at A she is better o¤ still.
We also note that when D is vertically above E (in the limit) Player 2 exhausts the simultaneous possibility of satisfying her own announced claim and compensating Player 1 to the level of utility that he can obtain in 'round 3'. That is, there is a natural upper bound for costs that can be compensated.
It is clear from this analysis that …nding sub-game perfect equilibria carries intrinsic combinatorial complications to the standard paradigm as a result of the 'sliding-down'variation. This variation will be formalized in Section 2 in terms of Player i's 'compensated present-values'd i (y); the contract value from some appropriate division (x; 1 x) in the current round, least or equal to the contract value from (y; 1 y) in the subsequent round; the subgame-perfect equilibria in N (z 1 ; z 2 ) (possibly as many as three) are generated from the …xed points of d 2 d 1 (:):We avoid considering complications to the geometric analysis, by favouring an algebraic approach, especially as the claims z 1 ; z 2 themselves must be checked for mutual optimality; see section 3.3 for some further intuitions.
As a reference point for our work we turn to the game without commitments, the simple Rubinstein negotiation game with w(x) = x: This has a unique subgame-perfect equilibrium outcome (which can be interpreted as a limit of terminated versions of the negotiation scheme in analogy to Figure 1 ) in the form: R( ) = ( 1 ; 2 ); where 1 + 2 = 1 and 2 = 1 ; so that 1 (1 + ) = 1: Consequently we have
For later comparison, we note the justi…cation of this formula from the observation that a oneround delay switches the identity of the bidder and, apart from a time shift, the continuation game faced by the new bidder is otherwise identical; hence pay-o¤s are necessarily transposed and discounted by :
The equilibrium point R( ) yields a 50:50 split in the limit when nears 1: Hence it is plausible in the case of a concave feasible outcome set to resolve con ‡icting claims by not modelling 4 If x 6 = z 1 we have u 1 (x; 1) + u 2 (x; 1) equal to 1 c [1 [0;z1) (x) + 1 [0;z1) (1 x)]; i.e. to 1 c: negotiation, and imposing instead an axiomatic solution. Such an approach, as Muthoo (1996) shows, favours a 50:50 split in equilibrium -ceteris paribus, i.e. when both players have identical linear capitulation costs. The paper remains apparently silent on the second issue raised by Schelling: can one impart a special role to a 'qualitative commitment'. Prima facie, this silence seems to be due to the very approach adopted in Muthoo's paper, by virtue of modelling with continuous penalties. Hence the present paper asks by way of a discontinuity hypothesis: do qualitative commitment tactics overturn the equitable outcome, say in the face of large enough, identical, capitulation costs?
Our answer to this second question of Schelling is in the a¢ rmative. More precisely, relying on the medium of an explicit negotiation structure, we can con…rm his tenet by demonstrating a qualitative shift away from the standard 'almost …fty:…fty'outcome. Such are, metaphorically speaking, the wages of spin.
The …rst main contribution of this paper is to show that, under an explicit negotiation scheme, there is necessarily a unique equilibrium division (arising from stationary strategies), so that by implication, as Muthoo (1996) points out, this uniqueness o¤ers a 'theory of strategic bargaining'. The second main contribution is to show how, in the model, the size of the capitulation cost a¤ects the equilibrium outcome and leads to a division veering well away (when nears unity) from the 'almost 50:50'equilibrium division R( ) of the negotiation game without commitment.
In the model of the current paper con ‡icting claims are avoided at equilibrium; but, this need not hold in all models and we refer readers concerned with impasses to Crawford (1982) .
Statement and discussion of main results
This section states and puts into perspective the main results of the paper, unfolding them in four stages. The …rst is that a unique equilibrium outcome arising from stationary strategies exists, despite the discontinuities in utility. The precise result is this.
Theorem 1 (Uniqueness and Existence Theorem). For 2 3
< < 1 and 0 < c C( ); the game G c of Section 1.1 possesses a unique outcome division S(c; ) = (x; 1 x) that is supported by a pure-strategy, subgame-perfect, Nash equilibrium, according to which subsequently to the announcement round, Players 1 and 2 play the stationary strategies 1 xy ; 2 yx with y = x+c: Uniqueness is proved in Section 4 and existence in Section 5. We should explain that the upper bound placed on c; de…ned as follows
which we refer to as the 'limit of capitulation cost', is akin to a self-…nancing condition, ensuring that players are always able to retain an acceptable payo¤ while o¤ering compensation (with which to entice the opponent away from a contract one round later, to a contract of equal or better value to the opponent one round earlier). Compare Figure 1 . The limit of capitulation cost, C( ); remains bounded by < < 1. In the statement above 1 xy ; 2 yx ; for any real 0 x; y 1; denote the standard stationary strategies in a Rubinstein alternating o¤ers game, as recalled below. The equilibrium existence is not accidental (see section 6).
De…nition. In the negotiation subgame N (z 1 ; z 2 ), let 1 xy denote the stationary strategy for Player 1 according to which his play is: propose a division (x; 1 x) and accept an own share at or above y in all rounds, and let 2 yx be the counterpart strategy for Player 2 in which she plays: always propose (y; 1 y) and accept a proposal (t; 1 t) with t at or below x:
The play of ( 1 xy ; 2 yx ) thus results in an outcome (x; 1 x) agreed in the …rst round of of the negotiation subgame.
The second main …nding of the paper is that at a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the commitment game there is a regime switch in the stationary strategies of the equilibrium outcome S(c; ). This switch compares the capitulation cost c to a regime switching function L( ) which is de…ned by L( ) =:
(1 )
and which satis…es L( ) < 1 2
(1 ). The second result is this. Theorem 2 (Division Characterization Theorem). In the setting of Theorem 1 the unique division S(c; ) depends on the regime switching value L( ) as follows:
where ( 1 ; 2 ) was de…ned by (1.3), so that in case (i) Player 2 receives above 2 :
Remarks. 1. It follows from the formula forẑ thatẑ(L( ); ) = 2 (L( ); ); i.e. the strategy switch from (i) to (ii) is continuous.
2. It is interesting that R( ) = ( 1 ; 2 ) does not …gure as an equilibrium division when c > 0: Player 2 may announce z 2 = 2 and thereby hold Player 1 down to an outcome of 1 : However, 2 is not her best reply announcement to his announcement z 1 = 1 : 3. Our …ndings support and quantify some common-sense expectations. The outcome is e¢ cient. The amount which Player 1 receives rises with c; albeit after an initial fall (see Figure  2 ), eventually rising above 1 : Thus a …rst-mover advantage occurs in the bargaining subgame (gain over R( ); the standard outcome of section 1.1), but only when c is above a certain threshold value, determined below in (1.6). The more the capitulation cost c exceeds the threshold, the greater is this gain. By contrast, it transpires that low penalty costs move the standard division unfavourably for the …rst-mover of the bargaining subgame. It would therefore be interesting to study …rst-mover advantage/disadvantage e¤ects of unequal penalties. 4. We have the explicit formulas:
5. Note that in the range (i) 1 > 2 : By (1.4) we have 2 = 1 + c: This last equation may be read as saying that in case (i) a one-round delay switching the identity of the proposer is accompanied by the new proposer facing an outcome equal to the discounted outcome of the original proposer reimbursed for the capitulation cost. Compare this to the analogous remark following equation (1.3) and to the identi…cation of compensations in Figure 1 . By contrast, in (ii) since
a one-round delay switches the identity of the proposer and yields, as outcome to the new proposer, the discounted outcome of the predecessor, adjusted by a falling compensation from the predecessor. The compensation eventually reverses direction to one in favour of the predecessor. See also below Remark 2 to Theorem 3, and Remark 4 to Theorem 4. 6. The payo¤ 2 to Player 2 in case (i) may be presented as the convex combination
(of 2 and unity) and is thus clearly better than 2 . 7. We comment that the term c=(1 + ) arising in (i) represents a compensation shouldered by Player 1. Interpreted as the series c(1 + 2 :::); it is seen to be the limiting present value of a stream of compensations incorporated into a back-stepping argument, appropriate to a terminated version of the subgame.
8. The piecewise linear form of S(c; ) is a consequence of the a¢ ne structure of what we call the compensated present-value function, see (1.8) below, though it is not obvious how many 'pieces'there might be.
The two possible divisions of Theorem 2 are identi…ed in the course of proving 'uniqueness' in Section 4. The existence proof of Section 5 veri…es that in the two complementary c ranges equilibrium conditions are satis…ed in respect of possible supporting announcement strategies. This coupled with a calculation based on (1.4) thatẑ(c; ) 1 (c; ) i¤ c L( ) completes a proof of Theorem 2, since Player 1 chooses whichever is the larger own share available to him at an SPNE in N (z 1 ; z 2 ):
Our third result describes the announcement structure in equilibrium; note the inclusion of a symmetric announcement ( 2 ; 2 ) for c L( ):
Theorem 3 (Announcement Characterization Theorem). In the setting of Theorem 2, the …rst round announcements (z 1 ; z 2 ) that are supported by a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of the commitment game G c are determined as follows:
The announcement characterization is proved in the course of the existence proof of Section 5.
Remarks 1. Recall that 2 < 1 for c < L( ); in fact for c < (1 )=2: Thus at the subgameperfect equilibrium both players'claims are satis…ed (possibly Player 1 receives in excess of his claim).
2. Note that in the case (i) of the Theorem 3 when the announcement is ( 1 ; 2 ) the claim z 2 agrees with y = z 1 + c. By contrast, in (ii) z 2 < y = z 1 + c; since as noted in (1.5) the claim z 2 = 1 ẑ falls progressively below y = ẑ + c as the capitulation cost rises. See also Remark 4 to Theorem 4 below.
Our …nal main result, a corollary of Theorem 2, identi…es how signi…cantly the equilibrium outcome S(c; ) characterized by Theorem 2 may move away from the standard Rubinstein equilibrium R( ) = ( 1 ; 2 ) of section 1.1. To formulate our result we need to de…ne the threshold value H( ) by:
( 1.6) and now the qualitative shift can be quanti…ed as follows.
Theorem 4 (Comparison Theorem). For 2 3
< < 1; it is the case thatẑ(c; ) is increasing in c on the interval [0; C( )] and satis…eŝ
Thus at the limit of capitulation cost C( ) the payo¤ to the …rst-mover is given bŷ
and this, as a function of ; increases from 1 2 to unity.
Example. When = 0:7 we have C = 0:23 andẑ = :77 whereas 1 = 0:588:
The proof of Theorem 4 is a routine deduction and is omitted.
Remarks. 1. Note that although the capitulation cost at its upper bound, i.e. for c = C( ); has a very signi…cant qualitative impact on the equilibrium, it itself remains limited being, as noted earlier, less than 0.25 of the asset, and in fact is vanishingly small, as nears unity.
2. Note that for 0 < < 1 the threshold value H( ) lies above the regime switching value L( ) and is likewise decreasing with : Moreover it is the case that
3. Since H( ) decreases from unity to zero, compare Figure 3 , lower values of (re ‡ecting higher impatience on the part of the players) correspond to a higher threshold value; so the higher the impatience level of the players, the higher the stakes need to be (as measured by the threshold value).
4. We note in addition to the identity (1.5) we also have
so, as noted above, the outcome to Player 2 not only falls progressively as the capitulation cost rises, but in fact for c > H( ) we have z 2 < z 1 . This means that after a one-period delay the compensation, accompanying the switch in identity of the new proposer, actually reverses direction in the compensation ‡ow which is now in favour of the predecessor. Proof strategy. Our main results are established in Sections 4 and 5 after some preparatory work. We outline the main ideas of the proof of the theorem and its corollary. A critical device of the Rubinstein bargaining model is to bring forward in time the value of a share x of the asset, if o¤ered to a Player later, by substitution of an earlier o¤er y of a share at least equivalent in utility (to that Player) taking into account the time-discount factor. Our argument necessarily hinges on the form of this kind of present-value calculation in the context of a penalty, and on the need to consider a 'penalty compensation'to induce acceptance of a share below the announced claim z. As a consequence of interpreting penalty as loss of a …xed proportion of the asset under negotiation, the assumed identical penalty structure gives rise to two time-homogeneous compensated present-value functions derived from one common function y = f (x; z); attributing value to a share x of asset accepted one round later, where the function f (x; z) is de…ned in a piecewise a¢ ne format, depending on the announced claim z; as follows:
for x in intervals of the form u i (z) x < v i (z); for i = 1; :::; n: It is monotone in x: Thus once (z 1 ; z 2 ) has been announced the players have individual present-value functions de…ned from f as follows:
The possible stationary strategy pairs ( 1 xy ; 2 yx ) in the subgame N (z 1 ; z 2 ) which follows the announcement (z 1 ; z 2 ) are determined by the …xed points of F (x) = d 2 (d 1 (x)): However, there may be several …xed points (actually as many as three such), each o¤ering a di¤erent allocation x to the …rst-mover in N (z 1 ; z 2 ). Thus to …nd the subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium involves identifying the largest …xed-point x(z 1 ; z 2 ), since that is Player 1's optimal choice of x in the subgame. This largest …xed-point may be regarded as de…ning the payo¤ pair for a commitment game G 0 c starting from the 'round 0'simultaneous announcement (z 1 ; z 2 ); and ending on a …rst round agreement with payo¤ (w(x(z 1 ; z 2 ); z 1 ); w(1 x(z 1 ; z 2 ); z 2 )). The argument now turns on …nding an announcement (z 1 ; z 2 ) which gives a Nash equilibrium in G 0 c . It turns out that in a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium of G c one will have z 1 = x(z 1 ; z 2 ) and that y = d 1 (x) = x + c: The details are worked out in Section 4, but for an intuitive grasp consult Section 3.3.
The proof of the Theorem investigates …xed-points by comparing cases. A large enough value for ensures that a multitude of parameters, dependent only on c and ; associated with the equilibrium divisions, obey unchanging comparative inequalities when c; vary (see the Lemmas in Section 3). Exploiting this 'comparison-persistence' one can also investigate the model by computer simulation without loss in generality.
Organization of the paper. In Section 2 we derive the compensated present-value functions d i (x; z i ) of the two players and give conditions in the Veri…cation Theorem for the …xed points of the composition value-function F (x) = d 2 (d 1 (x)) to generate a subgame-perfect equilibrium in N (z 1 ; z 2 ). In Section 3.1 we identify …xed points of F (x) as functions of (z 1 ; z 2 ); as these generate stationary strategies in the subgame, we intuitively interpret in 3.2 which from among these are likely to yield the equilibria of the commitment game. In 3.4 we compare various relevant parameters. In Section 4, using these comparisons, we narrow the search for equilibrium outcomes down to two. In Section 5 we verify that these two are indeed equilibrium divisions in complementary cost-ranges. A discussion of the justi…ability of stationary equilibria in this distinctive context of discontinuity is o¤ered in the concluding Section 6.
Preliminaries
In this section we de…ne the compensated present-value functions d i (x; z i ); we prove a veri…ca-tion condition for the corresponding …xed-points to generate subgame-perfect equilibria, then we compute the present-value functions for the case of our commitment game, and validate the veri…cation condition.
The functions d i (x; z i ) are de…ned by
y fu 1 (y; n) u 1 (x; n + 1)g; (n = 0; 1; :::); (2.1)
y fu 2 (y; n) u 2 (x; n + 1)g; (n = 0; 1; :::):
Thus if y = d 1 (x; z 1 ); then y is the least such that
where w is de…ned by (1.2); similarly, if y = d 2 (x; z 2 ); then y is the greatest such that w(1 y; z 2 ) w(1 x; z 2 ): In the standard Rubinstein game without commitments, where w(x) = x; we have of course that d 1 (x) = x and d 2 (x) = 1
(1 x): More generally, de…ne
then, since the subgame starting with Player 2's proposal is identical to the original negotiation subgame up to player transposition, we have (1.9). These de…nitions enable us now to gives su¢ cient conditions for the stationary strategy pair ( 1 xy ; 2 yx ) of Section 1.2 to constitute a subgame-perfect Nash equilibrium. Proposition 2.1 (Veri…cation Theorem). Let x; y satisfy
2 yx ) constitutes a subgameperfect Nash equilibrium with outcome (x; 1 x). In these circumstances a …xed point of the function F (x) = d 2 (d 1 (x)) generates such an equilibrium.
Proof. In any round if Player 1 is the bidder and bids for more than x, then according to yx Player 2 refuses. In the next round agreement gives Player 1 at most y; the compensated present value of which is d 1 (y) = d 1 (d 1 (x)) x; he therefore will not gain from delaying agreement. On the other hand, if Player 2 is the bidder and awards herself more than 1 y (o¤ering the opponent less than y), then according to 1 xy Player 1 refuses, so she can expect at best x in the next round, whose compensated present value to her is d 2 (x) = d 2 (d 2 (y)) 1 y: Thus Player 2 cannot improve her pay-o¤ by deviating from the stationary bid and delaying agreement.
To compute f (x; z) = d 1 (x; z); a more general approach is helpful. The utility w(x) = u 1 (x; 0) takes the form
Indeed, by (1.2) we have w 1 (x) = x c; for 0 x < z; w 2 (x) = x; for z x 1:
Thus the range of w excludes [z c; z): Hence the contract o¤ering x 'tomorrow'with k i x < l i is 'today'worth to Player 1 y if, for some i and j
however, if w i lies in [z c; z), the least inducement y making the Player prefer acceptance one round earlier is y = z: Solving the equation (2.3) when
we obtain the formula
We can now compute f (x; z) = d 1 (x; z):
Proposition 2.2. For the …xed-charge penalty regime, assuming c < 1 and c z 1; we have, for 0 x 1; that f (x; z) = f i (x; z); where :
Comments. A direct interpretation of these formulas bears on the type of equilibrium that may be achieved. See section 3.2.
Note that c=(1 ) < c + : Thus if z < c + ; case 2 arises i¤ z < (z c)= ; i¤ c=(1 ) < z: Note that if z + c < z; then the present value of a future claim z falls below the current claim even after compensation. Evidently c=(1 ) < 1: If case 2 arises, then case 3 occurs for (z c)= x < z= : Also if 1 z c + ; then cases 3 and 4 do not arise; but if z < c + and case 2 fails, then case 3 occurs for z x < z= :
Proof of Proposition 2.2. The equation (2.3) fails i¤ w 2 falls in the interval [z c; z) and this occurs i¤ x z (so that x 2 dom(w 2 ) ) and z c x < z: To see this consider the graph of w, or note that for 0 x < z we have w 1 (x) = (z c) < z c < z. Thus indeed f 3 = z; as shown, since z is the least inducement to an acceptance leaving the player no worse o¤ than in the next round. The remaining cases are routine applications of (2.4).
We …nally verify that the conditions of Proposition 2.1 hold. Proposition 2.3. For the …xed-charge penalty regime,
The increasing function f (x; z) has either one …xed point only at x = c when c=(1 ) < z, or otherwise it has one …xed point at x = c; and a second …xed point at x = z; and none others: In the …rst case we have for x > c thatc < f (x; z) < x; and so
In the second case, for c x z; we have c f (x; z) < x z; so f (f (x; z); z) < x; also for z x we have z f (x; z) x; hence f (f (x; z); z) x:
It follows from f (x; z) x that f (1 y; z) 1 y provided 1 y > c; so that d 2 (y) = 1 f (1 y; z) y provided y < 1 c: Consequently, since f is increasing, f (1 f (1 y; z); z) f (y; z) y and so d 2 (d 2 (y)) = 1 f (1 f (1 y; z)) 1 y:
Fixed points of F (x), interpretation, and comparisons
In the previous section Propositions 2.1 and 2.3 reduced the task of …nding subgame-perfect Nash equilibria of N (z 1 ; z 2 ) to computing the …xed points of
In this section we tabulate these …xed points, interpret some of them as likely equilibrium candidates, and then rank all the …xed points by size.
Tabulation
We begin by identifying an algorithm for computing the …xed points of (3.1), noting that importantly they fall into three distinct types. Then we tabulate the computed …xed points and o¤er an example graph. De…nition and algorithm. Recalling the notation of Proposition 2.2 that f (x; z) = f i (x; z) = a i x + b i (z) when u i (z) x < v i (z); de…ne the functions
This formula validly provides all the …xed points of
The conditions on x ij require to be rewritten as inequalities to be satis…ed by z 1 and z 2 : The algorithmic output is tabulated below, but the routine calculations are omitted. Evidently, the formula (3.2) solves explicitly the …xed-point equation:
Fixed-point types. Equation (3.2) indicates three types of …xed points, as follows. (a) Nine …xed points with value independent of the claims z 1 or z 2 ; correspond to i 6 = 3 and j 6 = 3 (cf. Proposition 2.2). (b) Three depending on z 1 alone which correspond to i 6 = 3 and j = 3. (c) Four with value x ij = 1 z 2 corresponding to i = 3. The nine 'constants'are compared in a lemma to follow.
In the table x ij refers ambiguously to the function de…ned by (3.2) and to its value. Reference is made toẑ =ẑ(c; ); to = 2 = 1 x 22 ; (with the x 22 shown below) as de…ned by (1.4) and to the additional parameters: Table 3 .1
Note that x 22 < x 11 < x 41 < x 12 and that x 22 <ẑ < x 12 : It is signi…cant that the z 2 range of case 11 is half-open.
(1 ); (ii) 1 ẑ ; (iii) 1 ẑ < 1 and x 24 < and z < x 12 < x 42 : It is signi…cant that the z 2 range of case 12 is half-open.
x 33 = 1 z 2 (1 z 2 ) < z 1 c + (1 z 2 ) and z 1 + z 2 1 (1 z 1 ) z 2 c + (1 z 1 )
Notes: (i) x 24 < x 22 < x 44 <ẑ < ; (ii) Case 23 holds i¤ z 1 < and if z 1 = we have c + (1 z 1 ) = ; (iii) Case 33 fails unless x 24 z 1 . It is signi…cant that the z 2 range of case 13 is half-open.
Note: x 24 < x 22 < x 44 <ẑ < < x 41 < x 42 :
Example graph
We close this section with an example graph showing …xed-points for a …xed z 1 against z 2 varying. Player 2 seeks to minimize Player 1's proposed division so identi…es the least value on the descending graph of the payo¤ to Player 1 1 z 1 not lying under any horizontal line.
In Figures 4a and 4b below note the presence on an 'elbow'at z 2 =ẑ where 31 and 21 are contiguous. In 4a cases represented from left to right: 43,41,32,31,21,11,12 so that the optimal reply is z 2 = x 11 :(Note the three …xed points.) In 4b cases represented from left to right: 43,33,32,31,21,11,13=12, so that the optimal reply is z 2 = 1 ẑ: Figure 4a . Fixed-points x ij ( ; z 2 ) as functions of z 2 : Figure 4b . Fixed-points x ij (ẑ; z 2 ) as functions of z 2 :
Interpretation
A propos Proposition 2.2 case 2, the two equilibria of the Theorem satisfy 1 <ẑ i¤ c < C( ); and 1 < x 22 i¤ c < 1 2 (1 ):
We now o¤er an intuitive argument, which needs proper substantiation. (A rigorous treatment is taken up in section 4.) Invoking the Coase Principle, see Coase (1960) , we make the simplifying assumption that in equilibrium both players aim to make demands that can be, and are, met by the opponent. We will eventually see that this need not hold in relation to all announcements in equilibrium; compare also Crawford (1982) , and Anderlini and Felli (1998) . Our assumption needs to be coupled to the 'Principle of Indi¤erence'according to which, in equilibrium, the responding player in any subgame of N (z 1 ; z 2 ) is either indi¤erent to a one-round delay, or prefers not to delay.
The simplest scenario is when the delay requires each player to compensate the shrinking of the asset with a side payment of c. Working back from the …rst-mover's satis…ed claim z 1 , a one-round delay in meeting the claim z 1 yields an uncompensated value z 1 < z 1 ; so to induce an acceptance the bidder o¤ers compensation by c, and hence might o¤er z 1 + c: If z 1 + c < z 1 ; this is advantageous for the bidder, permitting her in that intermediate round to keep more asset and still satisfy the counter-party. This suggests an equilibrium of type 22 based on y = z 1 + c = d 1 (z 1 ). (Here z 1 > c=(1 ) = 1 ; so this agrees with case 2 of Proposition 2.2). This is in keeping with the ideas expressed in connection with (1.3) in that an e¢ cient subgame-perfect equilibrium division could plausibly be of the form ( ; + c). This yields (1 + ) + c = 1; so that 1 = (1 c)=(1 + ):
The preceding argument holds only provided the compensation is not too large. It is possible (for large c) that a payment of c leads to over-compensation, in the sense that z 1 + c > z 1 : In this circumstance the only option to the bidder is again to meet the claim z 1 in the current round, and this corresponds to case 3 of the Proposition 2.2 where d 1 (z 1 ) = z 1 .
On the above argument (repeated mutatis mutandis for Player 2) any equilibrium must be covered by one of the cases 22,23,32,33. Case 22 yields the equilibrium of Theorem 2 referred to under (i) 5 . The pay-o¤ in case 23 is increasing in z 1 up to x 22 (see section 4.1), so is unlikely as an equilibrium value; the other two cases yield pay-o¤ z 2 to Player 2 provided no other cases dominate this pay-o¤. Comparison of the 'easier'case 32 against 12 where z 1 ẑ and z 2 > 1 ẑ leads to consideration of the inequality 1 ẑ c L = 2 : The latter implies that for c L case 12 dominates case 32 for z 2 > 1 ẑ; thus Player 2 maximizes her pay-o¤ under 32 with z 2 = 1 ẑ: This goes some way towards explaining where the other subgame-perfect equilibrium division arises. In either case we arrive at x = z 1 and y = d 1 (z 1 ) = z 1 + c: The …nal result is not immediate since one must investigate exhaustively dominances between Player 1's pay-o¤s arising from potential multiplicities of …xed points for a given announcement (z 1 ; z 2 ).
Comparison: some inequalities
In the lemmas which follow we rank the various parameters and the various pay-o¤s occurring in Table 3 .1 by size in order to verify constraints, and to locate the position of the all important pay-o¤sẑ and 1 ẑ. Lemma-b and Lemma-c help to determine optimal behaviour of the players. The proofs are routine and so are omitted.
Many of the inequalities between parameters are true for all c below the limit of capitulation cost C( ): These we term persistent. Others depend on what side of a single, threshold value (depending on ) the value c stands. To identify the dependence of comparisons on c we will attach various quali…ers to the comparison sign. Thus: g < Property(c) t is to mean: g < t i¤ Property(c) holds. In particular < is to mean 'i¤ c < 1 2
(1 )'holds. Speci…cally we will need to refer to the c ranges de…ned by the following thresholds, shown in ascending order (for > 1=2) :
an extension of (1.7), where
Referring to the …xed-point types identi…ed in section 3.1, we …rst establish a linear ranking for the type (a) 'constant pay-o¤s'. Then we locate the two parameters and de…ned at the top of Table 3.1. Next we follow up the location of and ofẑ which were de…ned in (1.4), and also of 1 ẑ: Subsequently, we consider pay-o¤s of type (b), i.e. those which depend on z 1 only. Lastly we consider a continuity feature of pay-o¤s of type (c), i.e. those which depend only on z 2 : Henceforth we make the following.
Blanket Assumption.
2=3 < < 1 and 0 < c C( ) = 1 2 : (3.5)
As regards the 'constant pay-o¤s', the three x 22 , x 24 and 1 ẑ; require special treatment; the remaining six satisfy persistent inequalities. We consider these six …rst.
Lemma-P (Persistent inequalities). Assuming (3.5) we have:
x 22 < x 44 < x 22 = x 14 < x 11 < x 44 < x 41 < x 12 < x 42 : (3.6)
The location of the constant payo¤ x 24 is bounded by x 22 and, depending on c; can drop below
Lemma-24 (Properties of x 24 ) Assuming (3.5) we have:
x 44 < c<T x 24 < x 22 < x 44 and x 22 < c<H x 24 :
A delimiter of cases 32 and 23 is given by : Recall that 1 = c=(1 ) is a delimiter of case 3 in Proposition 2.2. (See the subsequent comments.)
Lemma-(Properties of ): Assuming (3.5), we have transitively that:
The next lemma gives the only persistent inequalities concerning . All other inequalities depend on the location of c; e.g. x 41 < c>H : We need the following. Lemma-(Properties of ): Assuming (3.5) we have transitively:
x 24 < x 22 < x 44 < < < x 12 < x 42 ; and x 22 < c>G < c<L x 11 and x 41 < c>H The parameter identi…es the incidence of the all important case 22. Lemma-(Properties of ): Assuming (3.5) we have:
x 44 < < x 11 < x 12 ; and x 24 < c>G < x 22 = 1 < x 11 :
The next two lemmas locate the pay-o¤sẑ and 1 ẑ. Lemma-Z (Properties ofẑ): Assuming (3.5) we have: c 1 = 1 <ẑ < ; and x 22 < x 41 < ẑ < x 12 ;
implying >ẑ > etc., with the second inequality requiring c > (1 ) 2 =(1 2 + 2 2 ) and moreover 1 + = x 44 < < x 11 < c>Mẑ < x 12 ;
implyingẑ > etc. Furthermore
Lemma-1-Z (Properties of 1 ẑ): Assuming (3.5) we have:
x 24 < x 24 < 1 ẑ = x 21 < x 22 < x 11 and 1 ẑ < ;
and moreoverẑ < c<L x 22 equivalently < c<L 1 ẑ : (3.7)
The next lemma identi…es extreme values taken by the payo¤-functions depending on z 1 . These will help to …nd improved pay-o¤s for Player 1.
Observation. The case 22 in fact occurs i¤ c < L( ) in view of (3.7). If this case subsists it has the e¤ect of preventing (ẑ; 1 ẑ) from being an equilibrium, because x 22 > x 32 = 1 z 2 =ẑ:
Lemma-b (Ascending Elbows): For the functions x i3 (z 1 ; z 2 ) de…ned by (3.2) regarded as functions of z 1 it is the case, for any z 2 ; that x 14 x 13 (z 1 ; z 2 ) x 12 ; for x 14 z 1 ẑ; x 44 x 43 (z 1 ; z 2 ) x 42 ; for x 44 z 1 ; x 24 x 23 (z 1 ; z 2 ) x 22 ; for x 24 z 1 ;
with equality occurring only at the end-points. A continuity feature implies an 'elbow'shape also for the payo¤ x 3j regarded as a function of z 2 ; so identi…es a local minimum in z 2 : The information helps to …nd optimal pay-o¤s for Player 2.
Lemma-c (Descending Elbows): For the functions x 3j (z 1 ; z 2 ) = 1 z 2 regarded as a function of z 2 it is the case that
for z 2 =ẑ x 32 = x 22 for z 2 = provided and z 1 1 x 33 = x 23 for z 2 = c + (1 z 1 ) provided z 1 < and x 24 z 1 :
for z 2 = provided z 1 < x 24 :
Note that x 24 < (and > for large enough c).
We are now able to make an immediate and useful deduction. Corollary 1 (Consistency). All z 1 (resp. z 2 ) intervals in Tables 3.1 which are de…ned independently of the value of z 2 (resp. z 1 ); i.e. only by expressions involving c; ; are non-empty, with the exception of Case 22 unless additionally c < 1 2
(1 ): Proof. We omit the routine veri…cation. But note that
Hence c < 1 ; as required by cases 42 and 24; however, the case 22 requires that c < 1 2
(1 ): This is a stronger restriction than we assume in the Theorem.
Proposition 3.1 All …xed points in the …xed-charge penalty model generate subgame-perfect equilibria, provided c C( ):
Proof. This is mostly routine and omitted. (Actually, the condition c (1 )=(2 2 ) arises when requiring x 23 to be above c for z 1 at the left endpoint of the z 1 -domain. But in fact, we are concerned only with the right end of the domain, where the …xed-point is above c for c < C( ):) The Proposition thus follows from Propositions 2.1 and 2.3.
Proof of Main Results: uniqueness
This section is organized as follows. In Section 4.1, as a …rst step towards uniqueness, starting at Section 4.1.1 we begin narrowing down the choice of announced claim pairs to ultimately just three cases and note that these give rise to two possible division outcomes. The argument examines Player 1's choice of a …xed point x of d 2 (d 1 (x)); subsequent to the announcement round, and we …nd that for two of the possible announcement vectors Player 1 selects a …xed point (his proposal in the bargaining subgame) equal to his announced claim. We leave to Section 5 the check that the three possible announcement vectors satisfy equilibrium conditions in two complementary sets of cost values c as described in the Main Theorem of section 1.1. This last step is tedious and relies on lemmas detailing case incidence. Before proceeding, we note a direct consequence of the Veri…cation Theorem (Proposition 2.1) for the bargaining strategies 1 xy ; 2 yx . In the two cases where Player 1 employs 1 xy with x = z 1 and y = d 1 (x) in the negotiation subgame, the value z 1 satis…es c=(1 ) < z 1 ; so a reference to (3.3) and case 2 of Proposition 2.2 yields from (2.2) that y = x + c: 4.1. Exclusion Lemmas: Narrowing down the search for subgame-perfect equilibria This section shows that at a subgame-perfect equilibrium in the commitment game Player 1 receives one of x 22 orẑ; and that for c L his announcement satis…es z 1 = x 32 (z 1 ; z 2 ) =ẑ: We will later show that for c < L he announces z 1 2 ( ; x 22 ): The search-argument falls naturally into three parts according to the three types of …xed point x ij identi…ed in section 3.1, with each type considered in a separate subsection, starting at 4.1.1. Its purpose is to identify announcements (z 1 ; z 2 ) which are potentially supported by an SPNE and to dismiss the majority of these. Before we start the search we clarify the method employed and the kind of technicalities that need to be confronted to prove that certain announcements are not supported by an SPNE.
In each of the sixteen cases (i; j) we will look at pairs (z 1 ; z 2 ) permitted by the case, and test whether unilateral deviation from (z 1 ; z 2 ) can improve a Player's payo¤. One criterion, referring to Player 1's optimal behaviour, is that if we identify a case (k; l) and a vector (z 0 1 ; z 2 ) in its domain such that x ij (z 1 ; z 2 ) < x kl (z 0 1 ; z 2 ); then (z 1 ; z 2 ) is excluded from being an announcement in a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
The analogous criterion for Player 2 is more involved. To show that (z 1 ; z 2 ) in the domain of case (i; j) is excluded, we must identify (k; l) and z 0 2 so that x kl (z 1 ; z 0 2 ) < x ij (z 1 ; z 2 ) and also check that there is no 'alternative dominance'for some (m; n) of the form x kl (z 1 ; z 0 2 ) < x mn (z 1 ; z 0 2 ); as Player 1 would prefer to propose such x mn (z 1 ; z 0 2 ) in the negotiation subgame. The procedure here is to refer to an instance of Lemma-c identifying a local minimum of 1 z 2 and checking constraints imposed by end-points of cases 11,12,13,14. Lemma 10 provides an example.
We now list our Exclusion Lemmas which are used in an exhaustive search for the at most two divisions achieved in a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Lemma 4.1 6. Any announcement with z 2 = =(1 + ); in particular R( ) = (1; )=(1 + ) is not supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof. The play z 2 = =(1 + ) either yields an identical payo¤ of 1=(1 + ) to Player 1 for c < H under all cases that subsist, or, if c > H; o¤ers Player 1 a better reply of z 1 =ẑ. In the former case to avoid penalty Player 1 must select z 1 1=(1 + ): But for z 1 1=(1 + ) reference to case 31 shows that against such play, Player 2 can receive at least z 2 > 1 z 1 =(1 + ); since dominance occurs from cases 12 or 11 only.
Lemma 4.2 7. Any announcement (t; 1 t) with t <ẑ is not supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof. The reply z 1 =ẑ to z 2 = 1 t places (z 1 ; z 2 ) in case 12 and gives a payo¤ to Player 1 of x 12 =ẑ > t; so is a better response by Player 1.
Lemma 4.3 8. The announcement ( ; 1 ) is not supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium.
Proof. With z 2 = 1 we refer to case 13. Note that x 13 > for z 1 > : Thus 1 z 2 is not a best reply for Player 1 to z 2 . Finally note that x 22 < by Lemma :
Lemma 4.4 9. The announcement (1 ; ) is not supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Proof. One checks that z 1 = 1 = c=(1 ) is not a best response to z 2 = . An inspection of case 12 shows that z 2 > 1 ẑ holds (see note(ii) to Table 3 .1 for case j = 2); and x 12 >ẑ > 1 z 2 ; so that z 1 = x 12 is in fact the best response.
Lemma 4.5 10. If x 24 < z < and z 1 = 1 z; then the …xed-point proposals x over which Player 1 maximizes in correspondence to z 2 are as tabulated below.
for z 2 x 24 ; x 21 = 1 ẑ for :ẑ z 2 x 12 ; x 32 = 1 z 2 for x 24 z 2 ; x 12 for 1 ẑ < z 2 ; x 31 = 1 z 2 for x 22 < z 2 ẑ;
x 11 for : x 11 < z 2 Thus sinceẑ < x 11 < x 12 a best reply for Player 2 is z 2 =ẑ: Proof Cases j = 4; j = 3; and the case 22 fail. Note that x 42 x 32 x 31 x 21 : Lemma 4.6 11. None of the following announcements, including (1 ; ) for c > L; and (ẑ; 1 ẑ) when c < L; is supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium with outcome equal to (1 z; z):
(1 z; z) with x 24 = (1 c)=(1 2 ) < z minf ; g: (4.1)
Proof. To understand the claim here, note that c > L i¤ 1 ẑ < ; and that i¤ c 1 2
(1 ): We will need the comparisons of various thresholds in (3.4) of section 3.3. Finally note that 1 ẑ < by Lemma P-Z, and that if L < c < 1 2
(1 ); then 1 ẑ < . Thus we have 1 ẑ < minf ; g for c > L:
First we consider the z range 1 ẑ < z . We refer to case 12 with z 2 = z where for z 1 =ẑ we obtain a superior outcome to 1 z; as x 12 >ẑ > 1 z: This observation includes the case z = when L < c < 1 2
(1 ); so this is when (1 ; ) is indeed not an SPNE (but then (1 ẑ;ẑ) is).
Now we consider the range x 24 < z < 1 ẑ and we seek a best reply 6 to any …xed z 1 = 1 z >ẑ: According as x 11 ẑ or x 11 <ẑ our argument refers to one of the cases 21 and 31 which are contiguous at z 2 =ẑ (where the payo¤ to Player 1 is 1 ẑ). So recall from Lemma Z that x 11 <ẑ i¤ c > M ( ); and that M ( ) > L( ):
Suppose …rst that c > L: Thus if c M ( ); then x 11 ẑ; and so against z 1 the choice z 2 =ẑ gives Player 2 a best payo¤ ofẑ; since x 21 = 1 ẑ: But1 z 1 < 1 ẑ <ẑ; as c > L > 1 2 H( ): Thus the response z 2 = 1 z 1 with assumed outcome 1 z 1 yields an inferior payo¤ to that achieved for z 2 =ẑ. In conclusion z 2 = 1 z 1 is not a best reply to z 1 :
Now for c > M ( ); we have x 11 <ẑ; and the best response is z 2 = x 11 : Here Player 1 receives 1 x 11 ; i.e. Player 2 gets x 11 ; and moreover by Lemma P-Z 1 z 1 < 1 ẑ < x 11 :
Finally consider the case c < 1 2 H < L < M: By Lemma1-Z 1 ẑ >ẑ > > x 24 : Consider z with x 24 < z < and z 1 = 1 z: Here z 2 =ẑ satis…es z 2 > z = 1 z 1 and so case 31 holds for 6 If L < c < 1 2 (1 ) then 1 ẑ < ; and here for z 2 < 1 ẑ it seems that best play by Player-1against z 2 is with 43 where z 2 = (1 z 1 ) yielding 1 z 2 to Player-1.
the pair z 1 = 1 z; z 2 =ẑ: Moreover we again have c M ( ) and so against z 1 the choice z 2 =ẑ gives Player 2 a best payo¤ ofẑ:
Armed with the exclusion lemmas we proceed to an exhaustive search for subgame-perfect equilibria among the …xed points of Table 3 .1.
4.1.1. Nine functions x ij that are independent of z 1 and z 2
The aim in this subsection is to show that at equilibrium Player 2 selects z 2 so that x 24 < z 2 1 ẑ: This will come after our …rst step, which is to inspect the nine functions of the current heading. We will then discover that in consequence one only of these nine, namely x 22 ; gives a possible subgame-perfect equilibrium division.
The …rst six, of the nine functions, to be considered in our …rst step satisfy x ij = z 1 at an end-point of their domain, though three achieve equality only in the limit. By inspection of Table  3 .1 these six turn out to be x 21 ; x 22 ; x 11 ; x 41 ; x 12 ; x 42 . For all c these six have values in the same ascending order, namely:
Note that subject to di¤erent domain restrictions on z 1 the six functions satisfy x 21 ; x 11 ; x 41 < z 1 x 22 ; x 12 ; x 42 :
The …rst three are thus unlikely candidates, as we shall con…rm. (One expects intuitively at equilibrium to have x ij z 1 :) The remaining three functions of this group, ranked according to size, are :
with the restricted inequality requiring c > H( ). They all satisfy x ij > z 1 with strict inequality, even in the limit at the edge of their domains. We will see that the three cases indicated by the subscript are also excluded at equilibrium (case 14 despite the fact that value-wise x 14 = x 22 ): As a second step, we consider the observation that the values x 42 and x 12 are the two highest possible payo¤ values independent of z 2 as per (4.2). In choosing a best reply at equilibrium, Player 2 may prevent the former as an outcome by selecting z 2 > x 24 and the latter by selecting z 2 1 ẑ: Note that x 24 < 1 ẑ: This leaves only one case with x ij (z 1 ; z 2 ) = z 1 ; namely 22 as initially suggested.
Comment. Observe that the restriction just derived, namely,
opens the possibility of Player 1's pay-o¤s x 3j = 1 z 2 falling in the rangeẑ 1 z 2 < x 42 :
Having excluded two outcomes, the rest of this section is dedicated to excluding six others in consequence of the range restriction (4.4) on z 2 .
First consider the three cases with x ij > z 1 as noted in (4.3) (i) Case 24. Begin by noting that if 1 ẑ < then the case is excluded. So suppose 1 ẑ < x 42 (see Lemma P-Z and Lemma P). Refer to the ascending elbows of Lemma-b: the right end-point for z 1 in case 24 , namely z 1 = x 24 ; coincides with the left end-point for z 1 in case 23: But at z 1 = x 24 the the same restrictions on z 2 arise under case 24 and 23. It follows that for the z 2 restriction being considered, the payo¤ x 24 is dominated by the increasing payo¤ function x 23 (see Lemma b).
Player 2 optimizes his payo¤ by taking z 2 = (any larger choice incurs penalty). As the choice for (z 1 ; z 2 ) = ( ; ) is in the domain of case 22 we can con…rm that it o¤ers an equilibrium (see section 4.2.1). Since < 1
; the payo¤ to the players is (x 22 ; 1 x 22 ) = (1 ; ): Conclusion: For c < L the case yields an announcement ( ; ) which is part of a SPNE but with outcome (1 ; ): (b) Now assume that z 1 = is the right end-point. Then the z 2 -domain collapses to the one point z 2 = c=(1 ) = 1 : But (z 1 ; z 2 ) = ( ; 1 ) is not an equilibrium by Lemma 4.3. (c) Finally assume that z 1 = z is the right end-point with z = 1 z 2 < . For z 2 = 1 z consider case 13. Taking any z 1 > with < z 1 <ẑ we have z 1 > z = 1 z 2 and
c < L( ) we consider the case 22 which o¤ers the division S(c; ) = (x 22 ; 1 x 22 ): Here there is an interval of …rst round announcements for Player 1 to consider, and we show all of these together with the proposals x = x 22 and y = x+c form a subgame-perfect equilibrium of the commitment game G c . For the former division S(c; ) sections 5.1.1 and 5.1.2 below identify which cases ij of Table 3 .1 may occur when c L( ) when one of the Players is assumed to announce his component of the vector S as his announced claim. Inspection of these cases follows a natural structure. Identify sequences of cases with one index, for instance i; …xed and the other j running through consecutive values: these correspond to contiguous intervals of possible announcements by the other player and exhibit monotonicity of pay-o¤s. This simpli…es the identi…cation of a best reply. For the latter division we are mostly concerned with identifying 'elbows'based on the case 22 (see Lemma-c).
The case c L( )
In this section we work under the assumption that c L( ):
One checks that the only cases to occur are: 43,41,33,32,31,13,12. All of this follows from Lemma P and we omit the proof.
We now consider these cases. The cases: 33,32,31 o¤er Player 1 an outcome 1 z 2 : The identical outcome in the two cases 13 and 12 occurs on the domain z 2 > 1 ẑ and o¤ers Player 1 more than 1 z 2 ; so Player 2 maximizes his payo¤ z 2 at the right end-point of case 32, and thus plays z 2 = 1 ẑ: The cases 43,33,32,13 are contiguous (33 ends on z 2 = (c + ẑ)= where 32 begins, since (c + ẑ)= < (c + ẑ) for c > L; and z 1 + z 2 < 1 for this z 2 ), and so lead to a minimum payo¤ to Player 1 of valueẑ on these cases. Note that case 32 has a domain constraint of z 2 1 ẑ and z 2 so the inequality (3.7) is critical to this case subsisting. Note that x 11 < x 12 = x 13 (Lemma b) and the case 11 is excluded by dominance considerations.
The cases 41,31,21 are also contiguous (obvious from Table 3 .1 case j = 1) though the case 41 subsists i¤ c > (1 ) 2 =(1 2 + 2 2 ). As long as 41 subsists, it is the case that x 41 <ẑ (Lemma b), so all these cases have lower payo¤ to Player 1 and are excluded by dominance considerations. If the case 41 fails, then the case 31 is contiguous to 32 and so has payo¤ below x 13 ; so is excluded by dominance considerations.
Incidence of cases when z 2 = 1 ẑ for c L( ):
One checks that the only cases to occur are: 44, 43, 41, 33, 32, 31, 13 . All of this follows from Lemma P and we omit the proof.
Conclusions. The cases 44,43,33,32 are contiguous and end on z 1 =ẑ: (Cases 44 and 43 subsist i¤ c > H( ): If it subsists, case 43 'ends', i.e. has z 1 right-end point, where z 2
(1 z 1 ); as this inequality is sharper than z 1 and here case 33 'begins'. If the case 43 fails, case 33 begins at z 1 = ẑ: Either way the case 33 'ends' on z 1 = c + ẑ for c > L( ) by (3.3) . ) The pay-o¤s are weakly increasing along this sequence with case 32 o¤ering 1 z 2 =ẑ. The maximum on this sequence of cases occurs at z 1 =ẑ: The payo¤ x 41 is belowẑ i¤ c > (1 ) 2 =(1 2 + 2 2 ); by Lemma Z, i.e., whenever the case 41 subsists. The domain of case 31 has z 1 >ẑ and o¤ersẑ; i.e. below the demand z 1 :We conclude that z 1 =ẑ is a best reply.
The case c < L( ) : the case 22
In this section we work under the assumption that c < L( ): Our uniqueness analysis of Section 4 showed that in the negotiation subgame case 22 may be supported by a subgame-perfect equilibrium. Since in this case the payo¤ is (x 22 ; 1 x 22 ) = ( 1 ; 2 ) = (1 ; ); Player 2 will not wish to make an announcement higher than : We begin by considering the best response by Player 1 to z 2 = 2 = : 5.2.1. Incidence of the Case when z 2 = 2 = for c < L( ):
One checks that the only cases to occur are: 34, 33, 32, 31, 22, 14, 23 with domain of 23 a singleton.
All of these case return the same payo¤ of x 22 so that in particular all the replies in the interval ( ; 1 ) are best replies for Player 1. We now consider the best response by Player 2 to the two special cases z 1 = 1 and z 1 = and then to the general case < z 1 < 1 :
5.2.2. Incidence of Case when z 1 = x 22 = 1 = 1 for c < L( ):
'pseudo-…xed'points, i.e. values x such that F (x) = F (x+) = lim t&x F (t) or F (x) = F (x ) = lim t%x F (t), which give rise to limiting equilibria. These are "-equilibria, but of a speci…c form, which we term pseudo-equilibria (see web-site version of this paper). Thanks to Tarski's Fixed Point Theorem (see Tarski (1955) and Davies, Hayes, Rousseau (1971) ), games with monotone 'present value'still yield Nash equilibria, a natural assumption which is satis…ed here. It is the case that the largest and smallest subgame-perfect pseudo-equilibrium division is, just as in our model, a true '…xed-point'in the continuation game -this can be shown by a re…nement of the argument of Shaked and Sutton (1984) . We have not attempted to verify whether there are subgame-perfect equilibrium divisions which are not …xed-points. However, one can argue that for practical purposes, the pseudo-…xed points include all the pseudo-equilibrium divisions arising from monotone pure strategy pairs ( ; ) in the negotiation subgame, in the following sense. Going down the negotiation tree one may derive a relation between Player 1's equilibrium o¤ers conditional on the past to obtain the indi¤erence equations x i = d 2 (d 1 (x i+2 )) for i = 0; 2; 4; ::: . (6.1)
If this sequence is not eventually constant, it will be monotonic and will have as limit a pseudo…xed point. Terminating the sequence, at will, at x N = u; and reading the equation as a forwards iteration, establishes a unique sequence fv r (u)g de…ned by its initial value u; which is monotonic and converging as r ! 1 towards a nearest pseudo-…xed point (to u) of F (x; z 1 ; z 2 ). The function F is piecewise linear with slope either zero or 2 in each maximal interval of linearity, thus the convergence is uniform. It is for this reason that we may consider the in…nite negotiation game as terminating after some large, but reasonable, number of rounds depending on the tolerance level " admitted when looking at "-equilibria.
As regards the multiplicity of …xed-points, one can show that the largest equilibrium division of the negotiation subgame arises in the limit, as the horizon recedes to in…nity, of a terminated subgame, à la Ståhl (1972) , in which Player 1 as last bidder takes the whole asset. See Binmore (1981) ; the smallest equilibrium similarly corresponds to Player 2 taking all as last bidder. There may be an additional third stationary strategy equilibrium division, and this is characterized as the nearest …xed point from some …xed, alternative intermediate division of the asset in the …nal round (and horizon taken to in…nity). We refer the reader to Binmore, Piccione and Samuelson (1998) for a discussion of the support a perspective of evolutionary stability o¤ers to the signi…cance of stationary strategies.
